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Abstract
A housing price model is built to analyze whether there is a housing
bubble in the Norwegian housing market. The model is built based
on the general definition of financial bubbles. Fundamentals in the
family level are then introduced in order that empirical data in the
household level can be used for analysis. Empirical data conducted by
SSB in 2012 are investigated. No bubble is concluded in the current
Norwegian housing market.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A commentary paper wrote by Gjerstad and Smith, 2009 in the Wall
Street Journal describes the process of housing bubble inflating and
bursting in the time period of 1997-2008 in US. The great similarities
between the current Norwegian housing market and the early phase of
the US housing bubble described in the paper makes the questions of
whether we are in a housing bubble in Norway worth examining. To
avoid the housing bubble is important, because the bursting of a hous-
ing bubble could hurt the financial system seriously and further affect
the entire economy. Leamer (2007) states that the business cycles in
the economy are largely driven by the housing investment. The great
harmfulness has been evidenced from the 2008 subprime crisis in US.
Housing bubbles can arise when some households buy not on funda-
mental value, but on price trend or momentum (Gjerstad and Smith,
2009, Stiglitz, 1990, Duus and Hjelmeland, 2013). Therefore, the ex-
istence of a housing bubble could be identified by either knowing the
fundamental value of houses or the house prices supported by the mo-
mentum. However, both the fundamental value and the momentum
driving house prices are difficult to know (McClure, 2015). Some in-
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2dicators like the Case-Shiller index (Karl and Shiller, 2003) were suc-
cessfully used on identifying the existence of a housing bubble in US,
yet can be easily defended by the Norwegian politicians by Norway
being different (Solberg, 2014). Intuitively, an analogical comparison
between a verified housing bubble period and the current housing mar-
ket in Norway would be a good start for housing bubble investigation
(The observations of the U.S. are taken from Gjerstad and Smith,
2009):
1. The largest housing bubble in the US history started in 1997. It was
probably due to the rising of household income started in 1992 and the
elimination of taxes on residential capital gains up to $500,000 in 1997.
In comparison, Norway experienced a great salary increasing started
in 1996 (See Figure 1.1). And the yearly salary keeps on increasing
stably and evenly for about 20 years.
2. The bubble could have been deflated during the 2001 recession.
However, an expansionary monetary policy executed by the Federal
Reserve (Fed) in order to counteract the downturn kept further devel-
oping or at least maintaining the bubble. As for Norway, the downturn
was stimulated by the oil price decreasing in 2008 (see Figure 1.2) and
counteracted by the Central Bank of Norway by applying an extreme
low interest rate (see Figure 1.4).
3. The credit standards are eroded by rating agencies accepting the hy-
pothesis of ever-rising home values combined with lenders using rising
home prices to justify loans to buyers with limited assets and incomes.
Meanwhile, Norwegian banks tend to lend a mortgage to house buyers
that are more than five times of the family income. Young households
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Figure 1.1: the index of nominal yearly salary in Norway from 1970 to
2014 (2010=100)
Sources: SSB
4Figure 1.2: Yearly income (mNOK) from export of oil and nature gas
in Norway from 1970-2013
Sources: SSB
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are aggressively interested in buying big houses and strongly supported
by banks and guaranteed by their parents (Norwegian-Central-Bank,
2014).
4. The house loan increased by an average of 56% per year for three
years from $1.05 trillion in 2000 to $3.95 trillion in 2003. Analogically,
the average remaining loan of each household in Norway is increasing
from NOK250,000 to NOK1,000,000 from year 1997 to year 2012, with
an average rate of 26% per year (see Figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: Average Remaining Loan (kNOK) for Households that own
their dwelling, 1997-2012
Sources: Survey of level of living EU-SILC 1997-2012
5. The Case-Shiller 10 city index shows that the accumulated inflation
in home-ownership costs between January 1999 and June 2006 was
6151%, but the CPI measured only a 23% increase. At that time, Fed
monitored inflation based on CPI, so they continued the lax monetary
policy. Even after the Fed began to slowly raise the fed-funds rate
in May 2004, the average rate was still low and the bubble continued
to inflate for two more years. Not in coincidence, the probable rea-
son for Norway to stay on a low key-policy-rate (1.4) is the fairly low
CPI measured in Norway not considering the house inflating. And the
globally low interest rates make Norway no more choices than keeping
a low interest rate as well in order to stimulate its industrial exports.
Figure 1.4: Key Policy Rate in Norway, 2010-2018
Sources: www.norges-bank.no/en/Monetary-policy/Key-policy-rate/
6. Between 1999 and 2006, the price-to-rent ratio in the U.S. has
shot up from 20.8 to 32.3. In Norway, on February 16th, 2013, Dagens
Nringsliv(DN) wrote that there is a downward pressure on rental prices
in Oslo. The rental price was expected to be decreased by 20% for an
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apartment located in Oslo. This is also supported by a study by Dag-
bladet, showing that rental prices flattened out during Q4/2012 and
that more rental prices were decreased than increased. (Jokinen, 2013).
There are apparently some differences between observations from the
U.S. in the largest housing bubble period and the current situation in
Norway. A list of differences could be relative to the analysis of hous-
ing bubble are as following:
1. The homogeneity of population in Norway is high. In addition, the
discrepancy of family income is relatively small compared to US. As
a consequence, the economy of Norway is expected to be more stable
than that of US.
2. As one of the richest countries in the world, Norwegian economy is
capitalized by the government (Almaas et al., 2015). It seems sustain-
able for the government to support the well-established welfare system
and create job opportunities in order to maintain a low unemployment
rate. Whereas the U.S. is thought as a highly market-driven country
where unemployment rate could fluctuate frequently.
3. Norway applies a full-recourse loan system, meaning that the house
loan is connected to the household instead of the house itself. This
could make the Norwegian households more conservative than house-
holds in other nations.
4. There is a saying in Norway that the value of having ones own
house is not measurable in monetary terms at all. The stock mar-
ket and some of other financial markets in Norway are less developed.
8Houses are usually the main properties that the Norwegians invest on.
5. You can get tax deductions from the loans you have, which has
even better returns than the interest you get from your saving. And
in addition, you need pay tax for the earnings from your deposits.
6. Norway has a great amount of government pension fund. The
yearly return of the fund is about 400,000 NOK for each family in
Norway (Norwegian-Bank-Investment-Management, 2014).
These differences bring a great debate between foreigner economists
and native politicians. Debates between economists and politicians are
always endless because their concerns are different. First, economists
intend to predict the future of the economy and have more focus on
the sustainability, whereas politicians make most effort on the pros-
perity of the current economy in order to win the election for the next
round. Second, economists dare not to speak out statements in order
to draw eyeballs of their audiences. However, politicians are more re-
sponsible to their countries’ development so that they are cautious on
telling an even-existence truth to their people. Last but not the least,
economists’ statements are based on simplified economic models and
strict statistical assumptions which might have been validated in one
place (say US) but are not necessary to be correct in other place (say
Norway). Whereas modern politicians have better practice on their
national economy and get more supports from their native economists
whom have access to investigate more informative data. So the native
politicians should have a better overview of the real situation. Again,
there is a matter of whether they wish to tell the truth openly. There-
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fore, it is important to stay neutral between the foreigner economists
and the native politicians before an investigation is conducted on the
Norwegian housing markets.
The severe consequence of a housing bubble bursting drives many re-
searchers working on it. Two major problems are investigated: how to
distinguish a housing bubble and what is the mechanism of causing a
housing bubble. Both are equally important. First, one should be able
to distinguish a housing bubble and then second, one understands the
mechanism and knows how to control the development of the bubble
afterwards. In addition, if one understand the mechanism of the hous-
ing bubble, it will be helpful on finding correct indicator of the housing
bubble. Numerous researches try to relate a housing bubble to different
impacts, for instance, misguided monetary policy (Gjerstad and Smith,
2009), government policies stimulating house buying (Anundser and S.,
2013, Dokko et al., 2011), irrational expectation of rising housing prices
(Shiller, 2015), inelastic housing supply (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz,
2008). Some others believe that it is the informational asymmetries be-
tween the financial institutions and the private-label mortgage-backed
securities (PLS) investors (Levitin and Wachter, 2012). The mecha-
nism of housing bubble is so complicated that to fully understand it
is still long way to go. Instead, we are searching for the possibility
of identifying it from statistical data. Karl and Shiller (2003) applied
Cash-Shiller-index to predict the existence of housing bubble. How-
ever, based on our knowledge, most researcher apply time series data
or panel data to study on the development of a housing bubble and fur-
ther identify the bubble in a certain level. In this thesis, we try to use
cross-sectional data instead. And we investigate only the current situa-
10
tion of the housing market without considering its dynamic developing.
We are interested in the existence of a housing bubble in Norway due
to,
1. Such a housing bubble is risky for the economy of Norway.
2. It is interesting or at least a good training as a student to figure out
who are correct, the foreigner economists staying out of Norway or the
native politicians who may lie to their people.
3. It is good to stand independently, giving warning message or se-
curity information to the public on the situation of housing market in
Norway.
4. If the house bubble is serious, it is possible to give suggestions
to the government in order to have political adjustments for a soft
landing of the economic down-shock.
In this thesis, we intend to apply the empirical data in 2012 in the
household-level to investigate the existence of the housing bubble. To
be able to do this, we first define fundamentals of house and household
in the household-level. Then the price of each individual house can be
split into the fundamental part of the house, the fundamental part of
the household and the irrational part which inflates the housing bub-
ble. The conclusion of the existence of housing bubble is then drawn
by seeing how much percentage of the house price is caused by the
irrational part.
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The structure of the thesis is to build a house price model with vari-
ables indicating housing bubble based on the basic definition of a fi-
nancial bubble in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses what an ideal data
survey should be applied for testing the model and how we could com-
promise to use an existence data survey that were not conducted for
our purpose. Chapter 4 shows the analysis of regression results. And
discussion and conclusion are given in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, re-
spectively.
Chapter 2
Conceptional Model
2.1 A House Price Model Stemmed from
the Definition of a Financial Bubble
Different economists may have different views of what a financial bub-
ble is. However, it will be generally acceptable by stating a financial
bubble as the over-valued price part being unsupported by the funda-
mental of the economy. The over-valued part is in a sense supported
by the irrational expectation of the price increase in the future.
Housing bubble is a type of financial bubble. Based on the general
statement of a financial bubble, it is intuitive to divide the housing
price into two parts, formally writing as Equation 2.1,
CHP = CHP FUN +CHP IRR (2.1)
12
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where,
CHP: the current housing price,
CHP FUN: the part of housing price supported by the fundamental,
CHP IRR: the part of housing price supported by irrational expecta-
tion of house price change in the future.
We see that Equation 2.1 is more general than being used for defin-
ing a housing bubble. A housing bubble exists only when the second
term in the right-hand-side is positive. The equation applies also the
opposite case where the housing price supported by irrational expec-
tation is negative. Sequentially the market price of a house is then
lower than the fundamental supported housing price. This equation
gives also a clear picture of why government politicians prefer to state
positive opinions whereas economists would like to give negative mes-
sages. Because the politicians are more cared about the boomed prices
evidenced by their people and the economists are more interested in
the real fundamental hiding behind the market.
2.2 The Fundamental Part of the Hous-
ing Price
The current house price (CHP) of an individual house or the average
price of the entire housing market is easy to achieve. In Norway, the
price of a house is known by the dealing price in a successful trade.
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Even more, some agent companies charge households nothing for es-
timating the current prices of their houses. And you can obtain the
average price of all sold houses annually from the Statistic of Norway
(www.ssb.no). Seeing from Equation 2.1, one would be able to know
whether there is a housing bubble or not, given that one knows either
the current housing price supported by the fundamental (CHP FUN)
or the current housing price supported by the expectation of the change
of future housing price (CHP IRR),
Unfortunately, both the CHP FUN and CHP IRR are just formal
terms. Their determinants could be fairly subtle and thus to mea-
sure them quantitatively is very difficult. Macroscopically, the average
CHP FUN is expected to be equal to the long term equilibrium of the
housing price determined by the supply and demand of a purely free
market (Duus and Hjelmeland, 2013). In reality, such an ideal market
does not exist. Furthermore, the long term equilibrium tells the fun-
damental housing price in the past when all dynamic activities have
settled down (Duus and Hjelmeland, 2013). It is not persuasive to ap-
ply the long term equilibrium in the current time. This is also one of
the drawbacks by applying the HP-filter model in the housing market
analysis (see end-points errors in (Duus and Hjelmeland, 2013)). To
specify CHP IRR is even more difficult because it is almost impossible
to quantify the irrational expectation.
We are not going to make effort on the quantification of these two
terms. Instead, we intend to build an econometric model relating the
house price to its possible effects in terms of different explanatory vari-
ables. In these variables, we expect that some of them have a reflection
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of the price part supported by fundamental and some others give us
ideas of the irrational expectation. By testing the significance of these
variables, we hope the econometric model will give us some indications
of the existing of a housing bubble.
The pricing of a house is a combined reflection of the goodness of
the house and the financial capability of the household family. These
two factors in total give the fundamental part of the current house
price.
We also realize that a house price could vary due to the preferences of
different families. For example, the price of a house close to a good
school will be thought higher for a family having school children than
a family without school children. A house with large garden will be
less valuable for pensionists than young couples, as the garden work
could be hard and it is not affordable to rent the work out in Norway.
In considering these preferences, we apply family a group of preference
dummies on explaining the prices differences seen by different families.
We write the fundamental part of current house price as Equation 2.2:
CHP FUN = CHP HFUN +CHP CROSS +CHP TFUN (2.2)
where
CHP CROSS: the house price affected by the interaction of the house
and the household,
CHP HFUN: the house price supported by the fundamental of the
house,
CHP TFUN: the house price supported by the fundamental of the
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tenure economy.
By seeing Equation 2.2, it apparently shows that the fundamental part
of the house price is an independent function of the individual house
and household family. This is of cause not correct. The pricing of
a house is determined by the entire housing market, even the macro-
economy of the whole country. Therefore, one might expect that the
fundamental part of the current housing price would be a function of
macro-economic factors like GDP, CPI and so on.
We agree on this. However, we also realize that formulating the fun-
damenta in the country level is more complicated than Equation 2.2.
Communications between different countries, financial markets, busi-
ness units, imports, exports and macro-economic policies make the
fundamental value so difficult to be tracked such that Burton Malkiel
suggest that fundamental analysis is useless in outperforming the mar-
kets. Instead, if we define a fundamental in the family level similar
to the fundamental in the country level, meaning that each individ-
ual family has its own fundamental, the determinants of such family
fundamental will be much less than that of the country fundamental.
Being no buys and sales in an individual family, we can simply relate
the family fundamental to limit terms of family-scale economic factors
like family income, debt, properties and so on. By doing so, we have
implicitly assumed that the observation of the housing market in the
country level is the summed effect of housing strategy in each indi-
vidual family. This is similar to the so-called bottom-up approach in
the area of fundamental analysis. Imagine, it is fair to claim a housing
bubble if there is housing bubble in each family. In a most complicated
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case, there are both housing bubble inflation and deflation in different
families. To draw a conclusion in such situation can be difficult. We
hope the housing market of Norway is not in this case.
Another reason we can define such a family fundamental is that most
of individual economic indexes such as personal salary, family debts
are products of the current macro-economy. So an individual decision
or pricing on housing made by each independent family has already
reflected the fundamental of the economy in the country level.
In summary, the reasons we would like to define such a fundamental
in the family level is four-folds. First, it is doable to use the concept of
family fundamental to capture the entire housing market by applying a
bottom-up method, at least in some cases. Second, by introducing the
family fundamental we state that the entire housing market is formed
and behaved by each individual family, meaning all decisions of hous-
ing trading are made by households. It is therefore not necessary to
consider the fundamental value in the country level, which could cover
markets not just housing. This makes the investigation of housing
market much simpler. Third, the communications between different
financial units and activities are not included in the family level. So
dynamics disappears automatically. We do not need to conduct the
family fundamental after a long-term equilibrium. Therefore, current
factors determine current fundamental. In the end, the channels from
a family fundamental to the country level could be multiple depending
on the financial behaviors of the family members, while the channel
from the country fundamental to the family level is simply being the
job opportunity. Once stable jobs are given to a family, family mem-
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bers have right to make any decision they want. Therefore, to draw
conclusions of housing markets from the country fundamental is more
ambiguous than from the family fundamental. A schematic figure illus-
trating the relation between the country fundamental and the family
fundamental is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: schematic figure of communications between country fun-
damental and family fundamental
However, it is worth to mention that we do not consider the houses
being used for investing. It could be risky if there are houses existing
in the market for only investing purpose. But due to limits of our
model, we are not able to cover these events.
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2.3 Irrational Part of the House Price
From the previous section we say that the rational part of the price
of a house is supported by the goodness or quality of the house, the
preference of the family to the house and the financial capability of the
family. Whereas the irrational part of the house price is more subtle
to be defined.
Based on the definition of a housing bubble, a bubble is inflated if
there is irrational expectation of the price increase in the housing mar-
ket. However, part of the price increase of a house for the future should
be expected rationally. For example in Norway, the current economy is
good; the interest rate is low and stable and the unemployment rate is
low as well. So it is hard to blame that most Norwegian are expecting
a house increase in the future. In addition, it is a psychological phe-
nomenon that all decision makers in different families always believe
themselves to be rational, based on what they observe from market. If
they have already realized that they are irrational, they would of course
not take an obvious risk. Just like a drunk person never telling himself
being drunk, it is also impossible to get the correct answer on asking
each decision maker whether he/she is irrational. Furthermore, each
family, especially the decision-maker of the family, has its expectation
of the direction of the house price change of the future. The amount
of the expected price change is partly dependent on the fundamental
of the macro-economy, but is also psychologically dependent on the
characteristics of the decision-maker. For instance, by seeing the same
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high house price in the current market, different persons could have
different opinion. Some optimists might think the future house price
will be even higher because the house market is going to bring more
interests. Whereas some pessimists might think the house price will
experience a downturn because they think the house price has reached
a historical high point.
We don’t claim that we are more clever than all decision makers. We
have even less information than each decision maker on his/her own
family. Therefore, we don’t think we can get an idea of irrational ex-
pectation based only on information from an individual family. We
only assume that we have more information from the inferences of sta-
tistical observations than individual decision makers. We also assume
that we could conduct all data we want in order to spot the irrational
expectation.
If we are able to carry a thought experiment where there is a fam-
ily whom owns a house. The decision maker in this family has an
expected price of the house in two years time. He asks an agent com-
pany to estimate the house price after two years and gets an advised
price of the house. And he sales the house afterwards with a selling
price. In this experiment, we have obtained three prices: the expected
price, the advised price and the selling price. We also assume that
there is another price which is exactly the fundamental value of the
house. From these four prices, we could obtain the bubble value of the
house to be the subtraction of the selling price and the fundamental
price. This is the real irrational part we would like to obtain, yet un-
known due to missing fundamental value of the house. We could also
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get the subtraction of expected price and the selling price. We call it
the super-irrational part of the house price. Even though this part is
not the real irrational part of the house price, it tells at least some
information about the irrational expectation of the decision maker on
the current house. We call it a super-irrational part because it is the
irrational part exceeding the real irrational part the house price. While
the real irrational part has been taken by the next household. Next,
we define the subtraction of the selling price and the advised price to
be a pseudo-irrational part. We expect that the advised price from
an agent company should be more close to the fundamental value of
the house than the expected price and the selling price. Therefore, the
pseudo-irrational part of the house should approximately equals the ir-
rational part of the house price. There is another irrational part which
is the subtraction of the advised price and the fundamental value of the
house. This part tells the irrational expectation of the agent company,
which is very hard to be distinguished.
Based on the above experiment, if we define the current house price
as the selling price of the house, then the term CHP IRR should be
formally expressed as:
CHP IRR = CHP PSUDO +CHP AGENT (2.3)
where,
CHP PSUDO: The pseudo-irrational part of the house price,
CHP AGENT: The irrational part of the house price from the agent
company.
The super-irrational part is missing in Equation 2.3, because it is not a
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part of the selling price. It tells the irrational expectation of the house-
hold, but does not take effect on the current housing trade. However,
this part could affect the movement of house prices statistically.
The irrational part of the house price from the agent company is dif-
ficult to conduct, as the exact value of the fundamental part of the
house price is yet unknown.
Remember that what we would like to have on the irrational part of the
house price are indicators instead of exact values. So we can rewrite
Equation 2.3 as:
CHP IRR = β1CHP PSUDO + β2AP + β3CHP SUPER + α (2.4)
where,
AP is the advised price,
CHP SUPER is the super-irrational part of the house price,
β1, β2 and β3 are under-estimated coefficients of the dependent vari-
ables. α is the intercept of the model.
2.4 Model the House Price
We sum the fundamental part and the irrational part together to ob-
tain the model for the current house price. Combining Equation 2.1,
2.2 and 2.4 we have the house price model writing as following equation:
23 Chapter 2. Conceptional Model
CHP = CHP HFUN +CHP CROSS +CHP TFUN
+β1CHP PSUDO + β2AP + β3CHP SUPER + α (2.5)
where
CHP HFUN = NH∑
i=1αg1ivHFi (2.6)
CHP CROSS = NC∑
i=1αg2ivFPi (2.7)
CHP TFUN = NT∑
i=1αg3ivTFi (2.8)
vHF, vFP and vTF are independent variables that determine CHP HFUN,
CHP CROSS and CHP TFUN, respectively. The numbers of them are
NH, NC and NT, respectively. These variables will be discussed in the
next chapter.
Chapter 3
Data
3.1 Econometrics: A Data-driven Method
or A Model-driven Method
Econometrics has been applied widely in different disciplines, especially
in social sciences where a general rule like Newton’s law in Physics in
not applicable. Econometrics supplies a statistical tool to extract ideas,
infer hypotheses, summarize regulations from complicated data where
variables in the data are fully-communicated, humbly-related and of
implicitly-causality. By using a software like STATA every people can
run OLS (ordinary least-square) regressions and test hypotheses easily
by typing in short commands.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the data are the most im-
portant for econometric analysis. We may treat the Econometrics as a
data-driven method. It is understandable to highlight the importance
of data, because a comprehensive setting of data is the premise of a
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meaningful investigation. In addition, the deficit of robust mathemat-
ical tools for analyzing more complex models than linear relationship
prefers researchers a model the simplest (one could of cause have mod-
els with high order terms and/or logarithm terms, still, the basic theory
is linear regression).
We think that data are over-emphasized whereas the importance of
models is ignored in many researches. Oppositely, we believe that a
proper model is more important than or at least as important as data.
And data are only valuable when they are conducted properly by a
model. For example, in order to obtain a BLUE (Best Linear Un-
biased Estimate), the data should fulfill Gauss-Markov assumptions.
One of the assumptions is that all the data variables should be Gaus-
sian distributed, which means, in order to make an OLS regression
meaningful, all data variables should be tailored in a shape of ”Gaus-
sian distribution”. If we speak of the Gaussian distribution as a model,
we are saying that the playing of all data should be in a specific frame
of the “Gaussian” model. In addition, we know that an estimate will
have a risk of biasness if there are one or more variables omitted. One
would obtain biased estimates as well when there is collinearity or in-
correct causality in the model. The decision of including variables in
the model and clarifying the collinearity and causality is not told by
the data but by a carefully selected model. Therefore, we conclude that
building a proper model is more critical than regressing data blindingly.
Instead of using a data-driven procedure, we start with a model and
use the model to drive the usage of the data. In the next section, we
are going to carefully investigate all possible impacts that could affect
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the current house price of each family. We propose an ideal data survey
which include all variables that are possible impacts.
3.2 Model-driven Data: An Ideal Survey
Based on the analysis of the previous chapter, we conclude that the
current price of a house is determined by the four parts: the goodness of
the house, the preference of the household to the house, the economical
fundamental of the household family and the irrational part which is
supported by the unrealistic expectation of the house price increasing
in the future. In this section, we are going to convert these four parts
into steerable variables that could be conducted by data.
3.2.1 Determinants of the Goodness of Houses
We define “the location of a house” (zone house) as the first explana-
tory variable. It is easy to imagine that a house located in the city
center of Oslo is more expensive than a house with the same quality
in some remote areas in Norway. This variable could also be treated
as preference of the household to the house. However, since it is a
common-sense of almost all households, we attribute the variable as
the inner property of all houses. In addition, the zone of a house is a
qualitative variable, which means, hard to be quantified by the values
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of this variable. For example, if we give the value of the house zone in
the city center of Oslo as 10 and 1 for another house locating at some
remote area, it does not say that the value of the house in the Oslo
center is 10 times larger than the other. Therefore, when we include
this variable in the equation, it should be defined as dummies, or al-
ternatively, the samples should be divided into different zone groups.
The age of a house (age house) is another variable. New built houses
are usually more popular than house with ages, as a result of mod-
ern design and advanced construction materials applied. Beside, there
could be some special relations between the house and the age of the
house. For instance in Trondheim, people are unwilling of buying
houses built in the 1980s, Because they know that the quality of the
house in this period is relatively bad. In addition, a linear relation-
ship between the house price and the age of house is not necessarily
correct. For example, it is hardly understandable that a house built in
2001 should be cheaper than a house built in 2002. Because the age
difference of these two houses are so small that people usually have no
sense of the difference on the price. Therefore, it is at least worth to
try regressions by dividing the houses into different age groups as well.
The age of the renovation of a house (age renov) has similar character-
istics as the variable age house. Ideally, we should discrete the age of
renovation into several different variables: the renovation age of bath-
rooms (age renov bath), the renovation age of kitchen (age renov kit),
the renovation age of living room (age renov liv), the renovation age
of bedrooms (age renov bed) and so on.
It is intuitive to relate the size of a house (size house) to the price
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of a house linearly, as well as for the size of the garden of a house
(size garden). We could also take the size of the house more pre-
cisely into the size and number of bathrooms, bedrooms, living rooms,
kitchens and so on. However, when we use the more detailed sizes, we
should not apply the size of a house simultaneously as a variable in
order to avoid collinearity.
One variable of a house which is fairly important specifically for the
Norwegian housing market is the amount of common debts (amount cdebt)
of a house. The reason is that the common debts usually have a much
higher interest rates compared to the interest rates of house loans one
borrows from the bank. Therefore, with the same price of houses, peo-
ple pay more for the houses with heavier common debts.
Some of the side effects could be the existence of garages, balcony,
basements, attics, fireplaces/air-conditions and so on.
Below is a table (Table 3.1) of all explanatory variables we should
ideally have for regressing the fundamental of houses.
3.2.2 Determinants of Preferences of Households
to Houses
Different families have different preferences of their houses. We con-
sider the determinants that are reasonable in general-sense. House-
holds with some special preferences from very few populations of house-
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Table 3.1: The ideal explanatory variables for regressing the funda-
mental of houses
variable type label
zone house dummy/group the location of house
age house linear/group the age of house
age renov bath linear/group the age of renovation of bathrooms
age renov liv linear/group the age of renovation of living rooms
age renov bed linear/group the age of renovation of bedrooms
age renov kit linear/group the age of renovation of kitchens
age renov bath linear/group the age of renovation of bathrooms
qua renov bath dummy the quality of renovation of bathrooms
qua renov liv dummy the quality of renovation of living rooms
qua renov bed dummy the quality of renovation of bedrooms
qua renov kit dummy the quality of renovation of kitchens
num bath linear the number of bathrooms
size bath linear the size of bathrooms
num liv linear the number of living rooms
size liv linear the size of living rooms
num bed linear the number of bedrooms
size bed linear the size of bedrooms
num kit linear the number of kitchens
size kit linear the size of kitchens
num garage linear the number of garages
size garage linear the size of garages
num bas linear the number of basements
size bas linear the size of basements
num attic linear the number of attics
size attic linear the size of attics
amount cdebt linear amount of common debt of the house
is balcony dummy existence of balconies
is fire dummy existence of fireplace or aircondition
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holds are treated as outliers. For instance, most people prefer to have
their house in a quiet environment. Whereas there could exist some
families who would prefer to live in a noisy environment. Such fami-
lies having a special preference are far different from statistics and are
considered to be outliers.
Table 3.2 give a comprehensive list of variables as the determinants of
the preference of the household to the house:
Table 3.2: The ideal explanatory variables for representing the prefer-
ence of the household to the house
variable type label
good school dummy have good school nearby for family with small kids
good enter dummy have good entertainment places nearby for youngs
good view dummy have good view (close to nature or sea) for olds
good park dummy have good parking area for guest for youngs
good care dummy close to healthy center for olds or unhealthy people
good shop dummy close to shopping center for youngs and olds
good traffic dummy convient public traffic system nearby for youngs
3.2.3 Determinants of the Economical Fundamen-
tal of the Households
A house price is affected by the situation of each household’s economy
in two ways. First, the pricing of houses in the entire housing mar-
ket is determined the average affordability of the people living in the
market. Second, the price of each individual house is determined by
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the economical situation of the household. In a word, the average and
the deviation of house prices are both determined by the economical
fundamental of households, which highlight the importance of the eco-
nomical fundamental.
The work type is an important factor for a family involving in the
housing market. For example, the students are fairly difficult to buy
an apartment in Norway. They have no jobs or only work temporarily.
Banks credit them lowly and don’t want to lend money to them. In
other hand, Banks prefer to lend more money to the family who has
stable jobs. We divide the work type into two groups: stable group and
unstable group. So it is a dummy variable. We treat all self-employed
jobs as unstable jobs, which could be arbitrary. However, we think
that it make sense. Because if the self-employed personnel have good
incomes, their economical situation should be able to distinguished by
some other variables liking saving.
The salary from jobs are the main supports for most families. Besides,
one could have income from renting out part of his/her house. These
two types of incomes are different so that we treat them separately.
The main difference we believe is that the latter part of income is
more related to the house market.
loans are a groups of variables that affect the economical fundamental
negatively. We use two variables to describe the loans: the house loan
and other loans. The reason is the same as we split incomes into two
variables.
The payments are described by following variables: payment for kids,
payment for daily consumptions, payment for vacations and payment
for paying debts. Together with some other variables, we list them in
Table 3.3
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Table 3.3: The ideal explanatory variables for representing the eco-
nomical fundament of households
variable type label
work typ dummy two groups: stable(1) and unstable(0)
inco job linear incomes from jobs
inco ren linear incomes from renting
inco oth linear incomes from other sources
loan hus linear house loan
loan oth linear other loans
paym kid linear payment for kids consumption
paym deb linear payment for debts
paym dai linear daily payments
paym vac linear payments for vacations
valu oth linear values of other properties
valu sav linear savings
rate hus linear interest rate of house loans
rate oth linear interest rate of cars etc
year edu linear years of education for job member
num imm linear number of immigants in family
3.2.4 Determinants of irrational expectation of the
future house price
As discussed in the previous chapter, we use three constructed vari-
ables, the CHP PSUDO, the CHP SUPER and the AP , by giving
three prices of the houses: the expected price, the advised price and
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the saling price. We believe three three prices determine the irrational
part of the house prices, listing them in Table 3.4
We believe that we are able to draw the conclusion of whether there
Table 3.4: The ideal explanatory variables for representing the irra-
tional part of the house price
variable type label
pris exp linear expected price from household
pris adv linear advised price from agent
pris sal linear saling price
is housing bubble by giving a data survey with all variables described
above. We thus such a data survey an ideal data survey. It would be
great if we have an ideal survey for investigation. However, most time
we have to face the reality of high expense of conducting data in Nor-
way. Compromisingly, we have data conducted from SSB which are
not designed for our purpose. By comparing the data with the ideal
survey and after some data pre-processing, we hope that we can do a
similar econometric analysis. The real data survey is described in next
section.
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3.3 An Applicable Data Survey: the Real
World and Its Limits
The data we use is a 2012 survey conducted by the Statistics of Nor-
way (SSB). The questions of the data are designed for investigating
the living condition of the Norwegian residents. The survey was con-
ducted mainly through telephone interviews. Whereas in some cases
personal interviews are also performed. The criteria for family sample
selection are based on evenly distribution of gender, age, education,
family size and region. The survey covers information of both house
members and house situation itself. The variables for house members
consist of age, gender, number of kids, education, employment situa-
tion, income, debt and so on. The variable for house situation consist
of house bought price, house bought year, house size, house loans, pre-
dicted current house price and so on. After eliminating identification
information, the data are made available to researchers through the
Norwegian Social Science Data Archives (NSD).
Since the data are mainly focused on the living condition of residents,
questions are heavily distributed on the feeling and convenience of the
residents. Limit information of their houses is described. There are
no detailed information about the numbers, sizes and quality of bed-
rooms, living rooms, bathrooms, kitchens, balconies, basements and
attics. However, they have carefully invested on some items like up-
warming system in houses. What we can obtain from the data about
the fundamental of houses are information about:
The preferences of the household to the house are comprehensively
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Table 3.5: The real explanatory variables for regressing the fundamen-
tal of houses
variable label
county which country is the house belong to (in total 7 counties).
urban is the house in the urban area (1) or the city area (0).
size hus the size of the house
new renov the house have been renoved in the recent 5 years.
amount renov the amout of money has spent on renovation.
warmup the main up-warning system for the house.
drainage the goodness of drainage system
cooling the goodness of cooling system
decay the existence of decay problem of the house.
moisture the existence of moisture problem of the house.
light the existence of light problem of the house.
noise the existence of noise problem of the house.
air the existence of air quality problem of the house.
violence the existence of violence risk of the house.
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covered by the data. In addition to the variables we list in the previous
section, some more variables are supplied by the data which are,
The economic fundamental of households is also well described by the
Table 3.6: The real explanatory variables for regressing the interactions
of the house and the household
variable label
good bank convenient bank system nearby (for olds)
good post convenient post office nearby (for olds)
good hus general feeling of the house.
good env general feeling of the surrounding environment.
data, except some consumption terms are not collected, i.e., the yearly
payment for vacation.
However, the variables from Equation 2.3 could be difficult to obtain.
First, to ask all families in one or multiple regions to sell their houses
at the same time is impossible and as well betray the regulation of
market. Second, it is usually not easy to ask households to tell you
their expected house prices due to privacy issue. Therefore, we called
the experiment a thought experiment.
In a more realistic case, we should find some indicators for identi-
fying the irrational part of the house price. First, two extreme groups
of families should be much easier to be distinguished whether they are
irrational or not. One group is the families having no debts but sav-
ings in banks. This group should be defined as a non-irrational group.
The other extreme group is the families having no stable incomes but
buying unnecessary consumptions. The latter group of families are
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usually rejected by banks on housing loan. Therefore, this group is
not affecting the current house price.
Second, the families who have both extreme high debt-to-income ratio
and debt-to-value ratio should be treated as irrational. They have rel-
atively heavier part of irrational value on their house prices.
We take the families without debts as the base group and create a se-
ries of dummies by sorting the debt-to-income ratio from low to high,
writing it in Equation 3.1
CHP IRR = β1Dummy1 + β2Dummy2 + β3Dummy3 + ... (3.1)
where,
Dummy1: 1 if debt-to-income ratio >0 and <1 and 0 otherwise,
Dummy2: 1 if debt-to-income ratio >1 and <2 and 0 otherwise,
Dummy3: 1 if debt-to-income ratio >2 and <3 and 0 otherwise,
βi are the coefficients of different dummies. The drawback of Equation
3.1 is that it is impossible to figure out which dummy parts represent
the irrational part of the house price.
3.4 Data-driven Model: An Adjusted Model
A compromise of the ideal model and the real data gives us a more
realistic model, written in Equation 3.2 :
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CHP =∑α1iHFi +∑α2iFPi +∑α3iTFi +∑α4iIRi (3.2)
where
HFi is the ith variable of the house fundamental listed in Table 3.5,
FPi is the ith variable of the family preference listed in Table 3.6,
TFi is the ith variable of the family fundamental,
IRi is the ith dummy which splitting families into different irrational
groups.
3.5 Data background
In order to have a better understanding of the housing market in Nor-
way, it is necessary to have a brief introduction of the historical back-
ground of the Norwegian housing market. We take the description of
the historical background from Almaas et al. (2015):
A low credit default rate for the house mortgage has been applied
for quite long time after the Nordic financial crisis in the early 1990s.
Together with great successes in the petroleum production along the
Norwegian continental shelf, the Norwegian house price index increased
fast and steadily in the last 20 years.
Appreciated by the prosperity of the house market, many Norwegians
invested and earned more money from their homes than they earned
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from work. The increasing rate of houses is overheating. The total
value of houses is also historically high. According to SSB, the total
value of Norwegian houses is almost equal to the value of the pension
fund in 2014 (Almaas et al., 2015).
We believe that it is the credit relaxation making high climbing of the
house prices and debt-to-income ratio. The Norwegian credit market
was strictly regulated in the 1970s. The housing market was inactive
at that time. The government started to relax the credit in 1980s. The
liberalization process boomed the housing market and led to a sharp
increase in loan-to- income ratio. The collapse of stock market in 1987
was followed by increases of credit defaults. Many of the commercial
banks had to close down or merge with larger banks due to the loss of
loans . Not in coincidence, the housing price experienced a sharp drop
after over a decade of increase. The Norwegian economy experienced
a national crisis with the unemployment rate peaked at 6%. After
the 1990 crisis, the housing price started to increase again. Although
new rules were introduced to limit market risk, the housing market
continued increasing and so did the demand for credit. In 1998, the
government raised the risk weight from 50% to 100% for mortgages
with loan to value (LTV) between 60% and 80% (Almaas et al., 2015).
After 2001, the country entered another credit boom. The Norwegian
housing prices are entering a fast increase period.
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3.6 Data statistics
The data originally have 6186 samples, including both house-owners
and renters. The renters are not of our interest. So 1055 renters are
deleted, left with 5131 samples. We do not find any indication from the
data that houses under-investigated are used for investing. Therefore,
we assume that all house-owners need at least one house each for living.
The extra properties owned by house-owners are not considered in the
investigation. Then we find that some people predict their houses
prices too expensively, so that either the prices are not realistic or
these samples will be treated as outliers because they stay far away
from the data distribution. We cut the predicted prices by more than
20 million or less than 0.1 million . Another 505 samples are dropped
from the pool. Bought price of the house is an important variable in
our regression. Omitting the bought price of the house will bias the
estimate of other parameters. Therefore, we drop 150 more samples
where the bought prices of the houses are not supplied. In addition,
we delete 1138 samples which have negative loan-to-income ratio. We
end up 3338 samples. The statistics of data variables are listed in
Table 3.7. Some other variables are dummies or less important. Their
statistics are not listed.
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Table 3.7: Statistics of data
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Chapter 4
Data Analysis
In most empirical analysis, an econometric model is interpreted as re-
lating the dependent variable by some specific independent variables of
interest in order to infer the statistical significances of these variables.
Our purpose is a little different. Instead of looking for the relationship
between expected house price and its determinant factors, we intent to
compare the distribution of different determinant factors to the house
price. Such purpose requires us being cautious on almost all indepen-
dent variables. Therefore, we play many round of regression in order
to ideally make the coefficients of all related variables unbiased.
4.1 The Skewness
Initially, we plan to interpret our model (the expected house price) as
four portions of determinants, the fundamentals of houses, the funda-
mentals of households, the interaction between houses and households
and the irrational part of households. This is a rather easy and intu-
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itive way. However, the reality of the data forces us to do some changes
on our model, and further, changing our way of interpretation.
One important issue is the skewness of the data. Table 4.1 illustrates
the importance. In Table 4.1, we regress the expected house price
by single variable loan-to-income ratio (LTI) at the first column. We
expect to see a positive correlation. Because if we assume there exist
irrational moments on the Norwegian housing markets, the loan should
contribute positively to the house price. However, we obtain a negative
correlation from regression with a fairly low T-value.
After investigation, we find that this is due to the skewness of the
data, both for the expected house price and the loan-to-income ratio.
The second column shows the regression result by taking the log trans-
form of both the expected house price and the loan-to-income ratio.
Now we obtain a positive correlation with a much higher confidence
from the T-value. Here, we have thrown the part of samples having
negative loan-to-income ratio (it is not applicable to take the loga-
rithm of a negative value). We think it is plausible because we can
not blame any irrational momentum from the households without any
loans. In addition, the regressions in column 3 and column 4 tell that
the log transform does not affect the model inference if the correla-
tion is already clearly seen from the original model, but rather gives
an even higher T-value due to the improvement of skewness of the data.
The improvement of the skewness by taking a log transform can be
seen from Figure 4.1. At the left panel of Figure 4.1 we see that the
original predicted price is right-lagged, whereas after taking the log
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transform, the skewness problem becomes much better (seen from the
right panel of Figure 4.1). We see similar improvement of the skewness
by applying the log transform to some other variables. Thereafter, the
log forms are taken for the variables when we see their skewness is
improved by taking log transform.
Table 4.1: Simplified house price model for illustrating the impor-
tance of applying log transform for some data variables. Column 1:
single-variable model where the dependent and independent variables
are predicted price and loan-to-income ratio (LTI), respectively; Col-
umn 2: single-variable model where the dependent and independent
variables are the logarithm of predicted price and the logarithm of
LTI, respectively; Column 3: single-variable model where the depen-
dent and independent variables are predicted price and the house size,
respectively; Column 4: single-variable model where the dependent
and independent variables are the logarithm of predicted price and the
logarithm of the house size.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pred price log HPPrice pred price log HPPrice
LTI -828.740
(-1.24)
log LTI 0.047***
(6.13)
size hus 5002.167***
(19.23)
log HSize 0.477***
(28.62)
N 4443 3312 4443 4440
R2 0.000 0.011 0.077 0.156
adj. R2 0.000 0.011 0.077 0.156
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 4.1: Improvement of skewness after log transform. Left: his-
togram of the predicted price; Right: Histogram of the logarithm of
the predicted price.
4.2 House Price with Different Concerns
The first group of variables is the fundamentals of houses. The vari-
ables describing the fundamentals of houses can be divided into two
groups. The first group gives quantitative information of the house,
i.e., the size of the house, the amount of money invested on the ren-
ovation of the house, the bought price of the house, how many years
the household owning the house. The other group gives dummy infor-
mation of the house, i.e., whether the house is in the urban (a variable
called urban), whether the house has a parking slot, whether the house
attaches a good kid playground. It is intuitive and also seen from ini-
tial regression tests that the first group of variables have more effect
on the predicted house price. One exception is the dummy variable
urban. It is plausible that a house located in the urban area is much
expensive than a house with the same quality out of the urban area.
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Therefore, we expect the variable urban to be an important factor of
the predicted house price. We include it in the first group. The regres-
sions of the predicted house price on the first group is shown in Table
4.2.
First, one can see that the adjust goodness of fit (adj. R2) is becoming
larger and larger from Column 1 to Column 4, by adding more and
more relative variables in the equation. Secondly, all 4 regression tests
infer statistical significance of the considered variables. Their coeffi-
cients are slightly decreased after more variables being involved. Their
high T-values give us no chances to reject the significance of any vari-
ables in this group. In the end, by seeing the coefficients of different
variables, we conclude that the size of the house, the bought price of
the house and existing of the house in the urban area give the most
contribution of the predicted house price. In the regression shown in
Column 4, One percentage increase of house size will increase 0.294
percentage of the house price. When the bought price of the house
increases by 1%, the house price increases by 0.297%. When the house
is located in the urban area, the house price will be 11.3% more ex-
pensive than the house located other area with the same quality. The
renovation of the house and the own year of the house are also posi-
tively affecting the house price, but their effects are relatively smaller
compared to the former three variables.
The second group of fundamentals of the houses are dummy variables
that are most concerned by tenures in common sense (Table 4.3).
It consist of the existing of playground for kids, existing of parking po-
sition for guests, existing of house problems on warming up, drainage,
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Table 4.2: The house price model concerning on the fundamentals of
the house. In Column 1, the model is not controlled by any other
variables. In Column 2, the model is controlled by some dummy vari-
ables describing the general quality of the house (House Fund2). In
Column 3, the model is controlled by both the general quality of the
house (House Fund2) and the fundamentals of the household (House-
hold Fund). In Column 4, the model is controlled by the general qual-
ity of the house (House Fund2), the fundamentals of the household
(Household Fund), the interactions between the house and the house-
hold (HHInter) and the irrational indicator of the household (log LTI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log HSize 0.388*** 0.390*** 0.340*** 0.294***
(18.59) (17.69) (14.43) (11.74)
log HRenov 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(4.57) (4.43) (3.90) (2.99)
log HBPrice 0.313*** 0.306*** 0.277*** 0.297***
(22.57) (21.76) (19.53) (17.85)
own year 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.020***
(16.16) (15.23) (12.85) (14.39)
urban 0.199*** 0.192*** 0.178*** 0.113***
(8.17) (7.78) (7.30) (3.94)
House Fund2 N Y Y Y
Household Fund N N Y Y
HHInter N N N Y
log LTI N N N Y
N 2166 2142 2139 1686
R2 0.514 0.518 0.538 0.573
adj. R2 0.511 0.513 0.532 0.563
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
cooling, decay, moisture, light, noise and air. Seen from goodness-
of-fit (adjusted R2) of the first column, the correlation between the
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Table 4.3: The house price model concerning on the fundamental
dummies of the house. In Column 1, the model is not controlled by
any other variables. In Column 2, the model is controlled by some
other house fundamentals (House Fund1). In Column 3, the model
is controlled by both the fundamentals of the house and household
(House Fund1, Household Fund). In Column 4, the model is con-
trolled by some other house fundamentals of the house (House Fund1),
the fundamentals of the household (Household Fund), the interactions
between the house and the household (HHInter) and the irrational
indicator of the household (log LTI)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
kid playground 0.017 -0.015 -0.022 -0.015
(0.81) (-0.70) (-1.04) (-0.65)
parking position 0.283*** -0.010 -0.018 0.008
(8.17) (-0.24) (-0.43) (0.19)
warmup 0.158*** 0.025 0.011 -0.001
(8.62) (1.27) (0.57) (-0.06)
drainage 0.136*** 0.053 0.045 0.017
(3.09) (1.13) (0.98) (0.35)
cooling 0.018 -0.038 -0.042 -0.054**
(0.71) (-1.44) (-1.64) (-2.02)
decay -0.093* -0.078 -0.052 -0.061
(-1.88) (-1.61) (-1.09) (-1.28)
moisture -0.001 -0.012 -0.002 0.031
(-0.02) (-0.28) (-0.05) (0.73)
light -0.193*** -0.161*** -0.131** -0.162***
(-3.94) (-3.14) (-2.57) (-3.01)
noise -0.094*** -0.022 -0.017 -0.032
(-3.07) (-0.69) (-0.54) (-0.96)
air -0.003 0.034 0.048 0.039
(-0.10) (1.11) (1.61) (1.24)
House Fund1 N Y Y Y
Household Fund N N Y Y
HHInter N N N Y
log LTI N N N Y
N 4393 2142 2139 1686
R2 0.169 0.518 0.538 0.573
adj. R2 0.166 0.513 0.532 0.563
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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predicted house price and the group of dummies are not very high.
And the goodness-of-fit gets apparently improved by adding more re-
lated variables in the first group of house fundamentals. High T-values
in the first column for the existing of parking position, warm-up prob-
lem, drainage problem and noise problem could be due to important
variable omitting. Their statistical significance vanishes after includ-
ing more relative variables. The insignificance of these variables are
understandable, because most Norwegian are industrial and good at
house-work. Their houses are normally very well maintained so that
these basic problems like warm-up, drainage, moisture, decay will be
fixed by households if they have been discovered. One variable stand-
outs from the regression is the existing of light problem. The high-T
values for all four columns of regression on this variable shows clear
relation between predicted house price and the light problem. This
observation is very interesting and easily interpretable. Norway is a
North-European country. The light is extremely precious for Norwe-
gian habitants. Therefore, we see that a house having poor light condi-
tion is about 16% cheaper than with good light condition. A surprising
find is that it seems that households in Norway are statistically more
concerned on the cooling than the warming up of the house.
Even though Norway is a country of having relatively small economical
discrepancy between families, where High incomes families are heavily
taxed and low income families are governmentally supported, uneven-
ness of family economy is still very common. As a consequence, the
families with better economy are expected to live in houses with larger
size, better location and/or better quality. Additionally, the house-
holds having better economical situation should have better expecta-
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tion of the future house price so that they will predict their house price
more optimistically. Therefore, we should naturally see links between
house price and the economical fundamentals of the household.
Table 4.4 displays the regression of house price on the fundamentals of
the household.
Before we interpret the data, we would like to make a clear definition of
variable job stability. It is the total working hours of the major workers
in a family. By doing this, the self-employed workers are excluded from
the analysis, because we observed that those samples have unrealistic
working hours every week. From 3 columns of regression, we see that
3 most significant variables affecting the predicted house price are the
total income of the family, the existing of vacation house and the total
financial capital. The total income of the family is a most important
index for the economical situation both in the past and future. So we
see from the Column 3 that 1 percentage change of total income change
will induce 0.186 percentage change of the predicted house price. This
is about 2.5 times higher than the effect of owning vacation house and
about 7.5 times higher than the effect of total financial capital. We
see a decrease of effects from Column 1 to Column 3. We believe the
regression in Column 3 best describing the model because all consid-
ered variables are included. This can also be seen from the increase of
adjusted goodness-of-fit from from the left to the right. Based on this,
we conclude that the decrease of coefficients is due to variable omitting
in Column 1 and Column 2. It is interesting to see that the net debt
of the family (mkr TND) is initially significant to the predicted house
price and disappear it significance in Column 3. A carefully investi-
gation shows that there is a collinearity between loan-to-income ratio
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Table 4.4: The house price model concerning on the fundamentals of
the household. In Column 1, the model is not controlled by any other
variables. In Column 2, the model is controlled by house fundamen-
tals (House Fund). In Column 3, the model is controlled by house
fundamentals of the house (House Fund), the interactions between the
house and the household (HHInter) and the irrational indicator of the
household (log LTI)
(1) (2) (3)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log TFC 0.052*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(8.43) (3.53) (3.28)
log TTI 0.299*** 0.119*** 0.186***
(14.57) (4.70) (6.26)
mkr TND 0.017*** 0.008** 0.011
(4.62) (2.02) (1.58)
num property 0.059*** 0.022 0.010
(3.34) (1.15) (0.49)
have vacation house 0.106*** 0.077*** 0.076***
(6.54) (4.28) (4.01)
job stability 0.001 -0.005 -0.007
(0.11) (-0.38) (-0.55)
sick -0.022 -0.004 0.056*
(-0.92) (-0.16) (1.89)
num member 0.029*** -0.011 -0.012
(3.85) (-1.22) (-1.34)
years adult edu 0.007 0.002 -0.000
(1.57) (0.37) (-0.02)
House Fund N Y Y
Household Fund N Y Y
HHInter N N Y
log LTI N N Y
N 4431 2139 1686
R2 0.302 0.538 0.573
adj. R2 0.300 0.532 0.563
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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and the net debt: log LTI = log TND − log TTI. Therefore, in order
to avoid collinearity problem, the net loan should be excluded from
the regression when the loan-to-income ratio is included. In fact, the
net loan is excluded in the regression of other tables. The regression of
Table 4.4 is only for illustrating the effect of collinearity. We see also
that the number of member becomes insignificant in Column 2 and
Column 3. This could also be due to the collinearity between house
size and the number of members.
Table 4.5 shows the effects of the interactions between the house and
the household on the predicted house price.
Generally speaking, the significance of this group of variables are less
significant than the variables in the upper three fundamental groups.
It is plausible because the variables in this group are all subjective
variables. Compared to those objective variables like house size, the
subjective variables are more random and noisy. We see that the most
significant variables are good env, good traffic and good care. A house
having a good environment is 18.6 percentage more expensive based
on the regression of all samples. A house having good traffic is 8.1
percentage more expensive based on the regression of all samples. A
house having good care system nearby is 7.8 percentage more expensive
based on the regression of all samples. In order to check the difference
of preference in different groups, we arrange two specific groups of sam-
ples for regression. The first group (see Column 4) consists of samples
in which the ages of the house adults are above 58 years old. The
second group (see Column 5) consists of samples in which the ages of
the house adults are below 25. Our first expectation is that the coeffi-
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Table 4.5: The house price model concerning on the interactions be-
tween the house and the household. In Column 1, the model is not
controlled by any other variables. In Column 2, the model is controlled
by both house fundamentals (House Fund) and household fundamen-
tals (Household Fund) and the irrational indicator of the household
(log LTI). In Column 3, the control variables are the same as in Col-
umn 2 but the data are conditioned by the ages of the house adults
above 58. In Column 4, the control variables are the same as in Col-
umn 2 but the data are conditioned by the ages of the house adults
below 25.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
good hus 0.233*** 0.143* 0.174 0.010
(3.21) (1.76) (1.21) (0.07)
good env 0.277*** 0.186** 0.291* 0.123
(3.61) (2.34) (1.92) (1.05)
good shop 0.082** 0.006 -0.058 -0.020
(2.13) (0.15) (-0.76) (-0.21)
good bank 0.063 -0.045 -0.003 -0.084
(1.60) (-1.01) (-0.04) (-0.82)
good post -0.058 -0.033 -0.075 0.043
(-1.48) (-0.79) (-1.13) (0.44)
good traffic 0.137*** 0.081*** 0.109** 0.098*
(6.59) (3.37) (2.52) (1.95)
good care 0.118*** 0.078** 0.019 0.028
(3.84) (2.36) (0.30) (0.39)
good space 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
House Fund N Y Y Y
Household Fund N Y Y Y
log LTI N Y Y Y
N 4396 1686 566 341
R2 0.152 0.573 0.577 0.625
adj. R2 0.150 0.563 0.546 0.578
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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cient of good care should be higher in the 58 years group than the 25
years group. And the significance of good care should also be higher
in the 58 years group. Because we expect that the old people would
like to ease the hospital. However, we dont´ see this from the regression
results. This is interesting, as we do see that the good care affect the
predict house price. So there must another group of people who are
more concerned about this. Our initial guess is then the families hav-
ing small kids. However, it is still insignificant when we regress in the
group of families having kids less than 3 years old. After testing many
groups, we find that the good care is only significant when there is no
small kids and no olds in a family. This is not easy to be understood.
Table 4.6 illustrates the effect of irrational indicator of the household
(loan-to-income ratio) on the predicted house price.
All 3 columns shows clear significance of the loan-to-income ratio ef-
fect. The difference between Column 2 and Column 3 tells the bias-
ness caused by the collinearity between loan-to-income ratio and the
net loan. By giving 1% change of the loan-to-income ratio, we see
that the predicted house price is increased by 0.047%, which is 0.004%
larger than the model the net loan is included. In addition, we see the
goodness-of-fit is initially small (0.140) when only the loan-to-income
ratio is regressed (Column 1), and is greatly improved by having both
fundamentals of house and household in the model, which indicates
that the predicted house price relies more on the fundamentals than
the irrational momentums.
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Table 4.6: The house price model concerning on the irrational indi-
cator of the household (log LTI). In Column 1, the model is not con-
trolled by any other variables. In Column 2, the model is controlled
by both house fundamentals (House Fund) and household fundamen-
tals (Household Fund) and the interactions between the house and the
household (HHInter). In Column 3, the control variables are the same
as in Column 2 but the variable net debt (mkr TND) is deselected in
the model.
(1) (2) (3)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log LTI 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.047***
(5.05) (4.87) (5.37)
House Fund N Y Y
Household Fund N Y Y
HHInter N Y Y
N 3312 1686 1686
R2 0.142 0.573 0.572
adj. R2 0.140 0.563 0.563
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.3 House Price Model within Different
Groups
In the previous section we have generally discussed the effects on the
predicted house price for all available samples. It would be interesting
to specifically investigate the effects in different groups. For examples,
there might be housing bubble in some specific cities like Stavanger,
where the housing price is highly determined by the oil price. In 2015,
we evident the decreasing of house price due to the sharp downturn
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of oil price. However, in some other cities, like Trondheim, the house
price may be affected by the long-term change of oil price. Because
Trondheim is a high-technology, high-education dominated city and
therefore people are linked to oil price not as directly as the people
living in Stavanger. To investigate the group differences is the task of
this section.
Table 4.7 has 4 columns regression.
In the first two columns, the samples are grouped based on the loca-
tion of the house, mainly whether the house is located in the urban
area or not. In the next two columns, the samples are separated by
the number of properties owned by the households. The households
having more than one properties are selected in Column 3 and the
left are selected in Column 4. Though we see differences of both sig-
nificance and estimated value of coefficients in different groups, the
results are fairly consistent. The consistency in some sense give us
confidence on the model. The largest differences for the urban and
non-urban groups on significance are variables renovation and total
financial capital. They could be due to the large difference of the num-
ber of samples in these two groups. The largest differences for the
urban and non-urban groups on estimated values are loan-to-income
ratio and house size. The predicted house price is almost tripled when
the same percentage of loan-to-income ratio change existed in the non-
urban group than in the urban group.
We then divide the samples into 5 age groups based on the average
age of the house adults. From Table 4.8 we see that house size has the
largest effect to the age group of 50-60 years old. 1% change of house
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Table 4.7: The house price model within different groups: Column 1:
the house group in the urban area; Column 2: the house group out of
the urban area; Column 3: the house group in which households having
more than 1 properties; Column 4: the house group in which house-
holds having only 1 property. All columns are regressed by controlling
other variables (All Others).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
urban 0.000 0.000 0.318*** 0.073**
(.) (.) (3.07) (2.47)
num property 0.019 -0.002 0.015 0.000
(0.90) (-0.04) (0.23) (.)
log HSize 0.284*** 0.346*** 0.194** 0.301***
(11.28) (3.74) (2.09) (11.75)
log HRenov 0.019*** 0.021 0.044* 0.020***
(3.01) (0.95) (1.68) (3.07)
log HBPrice 0.300*** 0.275*** 0.314*** 0.301***
(17.35) (5.29) (5.15) (17.48)
own year 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(13.70) (4.54) (4.26) (14.06)
log TFC 0.029*** -0.018 0.011 0.021***
(4.12) (-0.81) (0.40) (3.01)
log TTI 0.188*** 0.216** 0.184* 0.196***
(6.44) (2.15) (1.72) (6.58)
log LTI 0.037*** 0.101*** 0.046 0.048***
(4.19) (3.38) (1.30) (5.51)
All Others Y Y Y Y
N 1403 283 198 1488
R2 0.584 0.457 0.606 0.591
adj. R2 0.573 0.378 0.515 0.581
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.3. House Price Model within Different Groups 58
size induces the predicted house price to be changed by 0.388%. The
renovation of the house is affecting the most for the youngest group.
However, the effect of renovation is relatively much smaller compared
to the house size. The bought price is most related to the predicted
house price for the youngest group, which is fairly easy to be under-
stood. Because the youngest group own their houses the shortest. The
bought price is thus the closest to the predicted house price. The most
important, we see that the coefficient of the loan-to-income ratio is the
highest for the youngest group, which could explain that the youngest
group have the highest irrational momentums in the Norwegian hous-
ing market.
It is also interesting to investigate the discrepancy of housing mar-
ket in different region of Norway. In the data, samples are selected
from 7 different counties. Therefore we naturally separate the sam-
ples into 7 groups. Each group contains samples in one county. Table
4.9 lists the first 4 groups and Table 4.10 lists the next 3 groups,
being County Akerhus and Oslo, Hedmark and Oppland, Out of the
country, Agder and Rogaland, Vestland, Trondelag and Nord-Norge
sequentially. We are not so sure about the regression because number
of samples in some groups are small (114 for Group 2, 152 for Group
7). One important observation is that the predicted house prices in
all these 7 groups depend mainly on several critical variables like the
house size, the bought price, the family total income and the loan-to-
income ratio. To pay more attention on the irrational indicator, the
loan-to-income ratio contributes not too much on the predicted house
price. the largest value of the coefficient of loan-to-income ratio is 0.083
for the Nord-Norge group, which could be interpreted as 1% change
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Table 4.8: The house price model within different age groups: Column
1: the group in which the average age of house adults is less than 30
years old; Column 2: the group in which the average age of the house
adults is between 30 and 40 years old; Column 3: the group in which
the average age of the house adults is between 40 and 50; Column 4:
the group in which the average age of the house adults is between 50
and 60; Column 5: the group in which the average age of the house
adults is above 60 year old. All columns are regressed by controlling
other variables (All Others).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log HSize 0.100 0.244*** 0.118 0.388*** 0.286***
(1.55) (5.14) (1.62) (4.90) (6.15)
log HRenov 0.049** 0.026** 0.028 0.018 -0.004
(2.52) (2.34) (1.53) (1.01) (-0.30)
log HBPrice 0.638*** 0.507*** 0.365*** 0.136*** 0.292***
(11.78) (14.51) (8.05) (2.90) (10.05)
own year 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.018*** 0.003 0.020***
(6.79) (10.54) (3.77) (0.84) (8.59)
urban 0.001 0.143*** 0.066 0.168** 0.175***
(0.01) (2.83) (0.86) (2.09) (3.00)
log TFC 0.027 0.020 0.019 0.037* 0.046***
(1.38) (1.60) (1.01) (1.90) (3.37)
log TTI 0.275*** 0.135** 0.377*** 0.197* 0.220***
(2.64) (2.08) (3.92) (1.96) (4.39)
log LTI 0.134*** 0.093*** 0.042** 0.064*** 0.052***
(3.03) (4.66) (1.99) (2.81) (3.23)
All Others Y Y Y Y Y
N 194 434 359 257 442
R2 0.708 0.635 0.412 0.504 0.569
adj. R2 0.652 0.607 0.357 0.435 0.537
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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of loan-to-income ratio causes 0.083% change of predicted house price.
Table 4.9: The house price model within different county group: Col-
umn 1: the group of houses located in Akerhus and Oslo; Column 2:
the group of houses located in Hedmark and Oppland; Column 3: the
group of houses located in out of the country. Column 4: the group of
houses located in Agder and Rogaland. All columns are regressed by
controlling other variables (All Others).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log HSize 0.346*** 0.328*** 0.307*** 0.301***
(8.44) (3.14) (5.25) (3.95)
log HRenov 0.010 0.044 0.030** 0.024
(0.93) (1.66) (2.19) (1.19)
log HBPrice 0.270*** 0.231*** 0.262*** 0.368***
(9.76) (3.75) (6.76) (6.83)
own year 0.024*** 0.011** 0.018*** 0.024***
(9.02) (2.42) (6.08) (5.34)
urban -0.041 -0.201** 0.126* 0.035
(-0.52) (-2.16) (1.73) (0.43)
log TFC 0.045*** 0.054* 0.016 0.014
(3.60) (1.77) (1.12) (0.63)
log TTI 0.256*** 0.119 0.237*** 0.128
(5.49) (1.11) (3.43) (1.49)
log LTI 0.061*** 0.077** 0.060*** 0.009
(4.09) (2.53) (3.04) (0.32)
All Others Y Y Y Y
N 436 114 327 220
R2 0.673 0.722 0.484 0.587
adj. R2 0.648 0.617 0.430 0.519
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
To blame all the households having positive loan-to-income ratio to be
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Table 4.10: The house price model within different county group (con-
tinue): Column 1: the group of houses located in Vestland ; Column
2: the group of houses located in Trondelag; Column 3: the group of
houses located Nord-Norge. All columns are regressed by controlling
other variables (All Others).
(1) (2) (3)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log HSize 0.218*** 0.118 0.282***
(2.85) (1.25) (3.19)
log HRenov 0.005 0.010 0.024
(0.25) (0.47) (1.04)
log HBPrice 0.262*** 0.512*** 0.342***
(5.26) (7.85) (5.81)
own year 0.015*** 0.030*** 0.019***
(3.82) (6.11) (4.22)
urban 0.155** 0.038 0.184**
(2.17) (0.40) (2.12)
log TFC -0.038* 0.038* 0.049**
(-1.86) (1.71) (2.08)
log TTI 0.256*** 0.024 0.121
(2.87) (0.23) (0.97)
log LTI -0.000 0.007 0.083**
(-0.01) (0.29) (2.29)
All Others Y Y Y
N 274 163 152
R2 0.380 0.655 0.640
adj. R2 0.300 0.573 0.547
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
irrational is of cause unrealistic. In Norway, most families buy houses
by borrowing money from banks and paying back the loans through
their whole life. Therefore in our model, only the households having
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high loan-to-income ratio should be treated as irrational households.
Table 4.11 divides samples into 4 different groups based on the value
of loan-to-income ratio. From Group 1 to Group 3, we see that the
coefficient of loan-to-income ratio increases significantly from 0.043 to
0.417. It tells that the predicted house prices are affected by the loan-
to-income much more for the high loan-to-income group than for the
low loan-to-income group. However, it is not statistical significance
for the group with loan-to-income ratio higher than 3. The reason is
ambiguous. In the end, instead of interpreting how much percentage
of predicted house price change due to unit percentage change of inde-
pendent variables, we try to normalize the change of predicted house
price to be unity and to see that such a unit change is contributed
by how much percentage of important independent variables. Table
4.12 shows the results. 4.69% contribution of the LTI to the housing
price for all samples in Column 4 infers a minor housing bubble in the
Norwegian housing market.
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Table 4.11: The house price model with in different loan-to-income
ratio (LTI) group: Column 1: the house group in which the LTI is
between 0 and 1; Column 2: the house group in which the LTI is
between 1 and 2; Column 3: the house group in which the LTI is
between 2 and 3; Column 4: the house group in which the LTI is
larger than 3. All columns are regressed by controlling other variables
(All Others).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice log HPPrice
log HSize 0.342*** 0.368*** 0.218*** 0.006
(7.60) (7.91) (4.80) (0.07)
log HRenov 0.002 0.011 0.028*** 0.052**
(0.15) (1.14) (2.66) (2.21)
log HBPrice 0.268*** 0.224*** 0.279*** 0.490***
(9.24) (8.12) (8.07) (7.60)
own year 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.037***
(8.77) (7.74) (7.74) (5.63)
urban 0.130** 0.157*** 0.052 -0.109
(2.53) (3.50) (0.97) (-0.96)
log TFC 0.025* 0.024** 0.020* 0.022
(1.81) (1.98) (1.95) (1.05)
log TTI 0.179*** 0.297*** 0.363*** 0.130*
(2.83) (5.74) (5.82) (1.76)
log LTI 0.043** 0.253*** 0.417*** -0.042
(2.36) (3.24) (2.80) (-1.53)
All Others Y Y Y Y
N 539 604 327 216
R2 0.596 0.611 0.719 0.609
adj. R2 0.566 0.585 0.684 0.528
pseudo R2
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
* p<.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.3. House Price Model within Different Groups 64
Table 4.12: One unit change of house price is contributed by how
much percentage changes of different variables in different LTI group:
Column 1: the house group in which the LTI is between 0 and 1;
Column 2: the house group in which the LTI is between 1 and 2;
Column 3: the house group in which the LTI is between 2 and 3;
Column 4: all samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
100% HPPrice 100% HPPrice 100% HPPrice 100% HPPrice
log HSize 33.93% 25.34% 15.56% 29.34%
log HRenov 0.20% 0.76% 2.00% 1.90%
log HBPrice 26.59% 15.43% 19.91% 29.64%
own year 1.88% 8.13% 1.71% 2.00%
urban 12.90% 10.81% 3.71% 11.28%
log TFC 2.48% 1.65% 1.43% 2.59%
log TTI 17.76% 20.45% 25.91% 18.56%
log LTI 4.27% 17.42% 29.76% 4.69%
Chapter 5
Discussion
We have performed several regressions of the house prices in Norway
based on the empirical data gathered in 2012. Those regressions are
logically understandable and interpretable for most variables. The ma-
jor find from the regression is that there is little housing bubble in the
Norwegian housing market.
However, our conclusion could bias from the real house market due to
following issues that are not easily captured by our model.
The first one is the use of loan-to-income ratio as the indicator of the
irrational part of house prices. It is reasonable to consider that the
households with high loan-to-income ratio have higher irrational mo-
ment than the households with low loan-to-income ratio. The former
accepts to take higher risk. However, there is no hint of determining a
proper loan-to-income ratio so that if the loan-to-income ratio is higher
than the proper ratio, the household becomes irrational. Therefore, we
really have no idea to identify the irrational part of housing price. We
can only conclude a non-housing-bubble when all groups of loan-to-
income ratios are not affecting the house prices. Actually, this is not
the case in our data. We observed high sensitivity of loan-to-income
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ratios to the house prices in the group where the loan-to-income ra-
tios are located between 2 and 3. The observation from this group
could possibly indicate a housing bubble in this group. Then the next
question is whether the housing bubble in one specific group means a
housing bubble in the whole housing market. I believe it is nature that
people have different risk-preference. It should also be acceptable to
have a small group of people inflating bubble of their houses, while on
the other hand, there are another group of people who could contribute
more on the housing market. It is then hard to say whether a bubble
created by a group of people can be absorbed by the entire housing
market.
In addition, we have stated that the houses used for investing are not
included in our model. We could of cause define similar variables, i.e.,
house fundamentals, household fundamentals and loan-to-income ra-
tio. The problem is that the predicted prices from the households of
this part of houses do not rely on the fundamentals any more. The
main ambition of the household for holding those houses is just waiting
for price increasing in the future. In fact, we should expect this part of
houses as full bubbles in the housing market. However, we are not able
to capture it and to sum the bubbles up to the houses used for living.
Some oral interviews done by the author to the Norwegians indicate
that there exist a few amounts of houses for investing. A large amount
of investing houses could shake our conclusion of non-housing bubble
in the Norwegian housing market. Further research and proper model
should be done for this.
In the end, we say that households can make free decision of buy-
ing or selling houses. This is an important reason of defining family
fundamental in our model. However, one should remember that this
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is given by the assumption that households have been given jobs by
the market. If the macro-economy is becoming worse in Norway and
people are becoming unemployed, a stable housing market could be
easily destroyed without financial support. Unfortunately, we are ex-
periencing this now. The sharp decrease of crude oil price worldwide
makes the unemployment rate climbing up in 2015. Prediction shows
that the low oil price will keep steady until the end of 2016. This
will seriously affect the housing market in Norway. We are evidencing
changes in Stavanger now. It would be interesting to investigate on
the possibility of housing bubble caused by this and if does, how fast it
will spread out of the whole country. Such type of bubble stimulated
by the external and global economy is not able to be captured by our
model. Further works should be done to handle the above issues.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We build a housing price model for investigating the existing of housing
bubble in Norway. The model is based on the definition of a financial
bubble. We also define fundamentals in the family level. We find that
the analysis becomes much simpler compared to investigating funda-
mental in the country level. The housing price is split into four part,
the fundamental of the house, the fundamental of the household, the
fundamental of the interactions of the house and the household, and
the bubble part which is supported by the irrational expectation of
housing increase in the future.
The 2012 data survey conducted by SSB is not necessary to be ideal,
but good enough for our analysis. We have regressed the housing prices
controlled by different variables and into different groups. The depen-
dency of housing price change due to changes of different variables
varies in different experiments, yet the results are stable and inter-
pretable.We use loan-to-income ratio as the indicator of the bubble
term, which could be misleading because a normal loan-to-income ra-
tio may not inflate any bubble. The limit of the real data makes us no
other choice on the bubble reflection.
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Based on our analysis, we conclude that there is no housing bubble in
the entire Norwegian housing market. This is consistent with the con-
clusion from Duus’s thesis (Duus and Hjelmeland, 2013), where she in-
vesting the Norwegian housing bubble based on statistical data. How-
ever, we also find that there exist some groups (groups with high loan-
to-income ratios) where the bubble indicator remarkably affects the
housing price, which might indicate bubbles in these specific groups.
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